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^ THE DISTRIBUTION OF INHERITANCE
AND THE INEQUALITY OF WEALTH WITHIN FAMILIES
by JAMES D. AJ)AMS
I. Introduction
Although it has long been recognized that inheritance affects overall
wealth dispersion, and is probably a source of its positive skewness as well,
few studies seem to have been undertaken which attempt to trace the manner
of this influence. Throughout this paper, the term family refers to the nuclear
family. Analyzed along family lines, wealth is characterized by dispersion within
families and by dispersion between families. The primary purpose of this paper
is to examine the relationship of inheritance to within family inequality,
although its between family aspect is also more briefly discussed.
A
^ As will be demonstrated below, if inheritance were larger to the more
disadvantaged sons or daughters Within a family, it would reduce the dispersion
of wealth within families. If instead inheritance followed a "custom" of equal
division, it would not directly influence within family inequality, even though
it increased inequality between families.
The first example is referred to as Compensatory Inheritance, because less
advantaged persons within a feimily are compensated for lesser wealth. It
illustrates a largely unrecognized ambiguity in the link between inheritance
and the dispersion of wealth. Only if inheritance increases the between
family component by more than it decreases the within family component does it
increase overall wealth inequality.
From a policy point of view, the issue of Compensatory Inheritance is not
unimportant, since if inheritance were truly equal, the primary effect of transfer
taxation would be to narrow differences in wealth among families. In contrast,
if inheritance were compensatory, then transfer taxation would have an uncertain
.•A -
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effect on Inequality, and any reduction would be overstated by between family
effects alone.
Except for an article by Fyjalkowski-Bereday (1950) there appear to have
been no studies bearing on the compensation issue. VJhile equal inheritance among
sons and daughters seems to be common, there is sufficient variation in empirical
samples that this conclusion cannot be drawn prior to a careful investigation.
Moreover, equality of inheritance may reflect zero inheritance to everyone, v^ich
does not test the hypothesis.
The principal findings of this study are as follows. First, there is
scant direct evidence that inheritsuice is compensatory. However, for reasons
to be explained, apparent equality may conceal true compensation. Second, sons
and daughters do not seem to receive inheritances because of their contributions
to the donor during his lifetime, although other recipients do inherit for this
reason. Third, inheritances received by sons and daughters are strongly and
negatively contingent on the survival of the spouse. Fourth, the probability of
positive inheritance rises with family income and the estimated income elasticity
of Inheritance exceeds one. These findings support the suggestion of Figou
(1962) that inheritance contributes to the positive skewness of the income dis
tribution.
Section II of the paper develops the basic model and two alternative
hypotheses, one predicting Compensatory Inheritance, the other Equal or even
Anticompensatory Inheritance. Section tlX describes the data and the approach
used in the empirical work. Section IV presents the findings, while the final
section summarizes the paper and suggests ways in which supplementary evidence
could strengthen or amend its conclusions.
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II. Alternative inheritance models
A. Basic euialytical framework
The theoretical approach taken draws on earlier work by the author
[Adams (1976, 1978)] and by Becker (1974). It is assumed throughout that the
donor is an Altruist with respect to each recipient. Only the utility..levels
of recipients enter the donor's utility function, eliminating the composition of
their consumption as a source of dispute. Therefore, the donor transfers
unrestricted wealth to his recipients, and the amounts are determined subject
to a budget constraint. Following the literature on separability/ in demand
analysis [see Gorman (1959) and Strotz (1959)], if he is able to preallocate his
wealth among recipients, the donor must possess a strongly separable lifetime
utility function of the form
U=Gj,(Cd) +2 (C^^). (1)
where and the C„. are lifetime expenditures on consumption of the donor and
D Rj
the jth recipient respectively, while and the G^^ measure the respective
contributions of the donor's and the jth recipient's consumption to the donor's
utility,—^ Moreover, G_. must be a monotonic transformation of the jth recipient's
utility function, since only the utility of a recipient matters to an Altruistic
donor. Certainty of length of life is assumed, although swne implications of
uncertainty are developed at a later point.
The donor's utility is maximized subject to his budget constraint,
"d = S + ^ ^Dj'
J
\rtiere is his wealth and the T^^^ are gross transfers, or lifetime expenditures
on the jth recipient, including the inheritance. Notice that recipients could
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contribute Co and be rewarded through inheritance, or by other means.
This approach rules out indifference on the part pf the donor regarding
the division of estates and other transfers, because consumptions of different
recipients are imperfect substitutes. Evidence presented by Boskin (1976)
supports this assumption by finding finite price effects of estate tax exemp
tions favoring charities.
Gross transfers are not equal to the amount received by J, defined as
du® to costs of making the transfers, apd
P T = T (3)^Rj^Rj ^Dj
where (which may depend on the average cost of transferring
3/
units of wealth, each worth one dollar.— The net transfer of dollars i
to £in endowment of E_. comprises the wealth of the jth recipient. Hence,
Rj
Maximizing (1) subject to (2), (3), and (4),
" 0
- 2: T^. = 0,D D J Dj
(5)
4/where MC_. = P_. + T_. the jth marginal transfer cost,-^ Second
Rj Rj Rj Rj Rj
order conditions are assumed to be satisfied.—^ Since this model inq)lies equal
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marginal costs of transfers across different forms to any one recipient (see
footnote A), and because marginal costs of property transfers 5uch as gifts
and inheritances are the same for all recipients, this framework implies
MC„. = MC^o for any two recipients j and'in a sample where property transfers
Rj Rx.
^ are made. From equation (5), this implies equalization of marginal utilitiiesj
hence 3G^. / 30^^ = 8G^^/
An absence of systematic favoritism is assumed with respect tp sons and
daughters. There is said to be no favoring between any two recipients j and
£ if for equal consumption (hence the donor receives equal marginal
utilities, or equality of marginal costs and the
*\ absence of favoritism imply the equalization of consumption among children,
^ using (5) and the definition just given.—^ In a sample where there is positive
inheritance, diildren who have larger endowments receive smaller total transfers,
A
since by equation (4) if , assuming = Cj^.
Under the conditions specified, the model suggests that total transfers,
which assume many forms other than inheritance, are compensatory to the less
advantaged children in a family. The conditions are shown geometrically in
Figure 1 for a two recipient case. Line DF holds the sum of the two endowments
constant. Point E represents the endowment point and assumes that 2 is the
more advantaged recipient. Line AB indicates the. trade-off between consump
tion of 1 and 2 and incorporates total transfers to each; it is drawn assuming
equal transfer costs. If there is no favoritism, the equilibrium occurs at
C, and equal consumption takes place.
In practice, compensation may be partial rather thap, complete,? because
" transfers may not be l^rge enough to offset the inequality of endowments
and because there may be unsystematic favoritism. Nevertheless, even partial
-6-
Equallcy Line
FKIURK I - Wealth Transfers and Compensation
Within the Family
'R1
compensation reduces within family inequality. Ihis can be shown as follows.
Compensation takes place if the difference in absolute value between the
jth person's wealth and the mean wealth for the family is smaller than the
absolute value of the difference in j*s endowment and the mean endowment.—^
Thus, if there Is compensation
IV - ''Ri (6)
0 £ ^ subscript 1 represents the ith family, is the wealth
of the jth member of the ith family, W is mean wealth of the 1th family, and
Kx
so forth. Notice that measures the degree of compensation, which is total
if = 0.
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Following the conventions of the analysis of variance, the within family
variance of wealth inclusive of transfers is
2 %11 - "r1" Z T. —y . (7)w ^ j N- 1
where N-1 is the total number of individuals. The within family variance of
^2
wealth prior to transfers, , is the variance of endowments. Or
i j
/v2 2
Clearly, O > o and transfers reduce the variance, if (6) holds, since
w w
every squared terra in (7) is less than its counterpart in (8) under these
8/
conditions.—
The model must be extended if it is to encompass the effects of uncer
tainty, which are important in at least two ways. First, the income of recip
ients in future periods may shift relative to expectations. Second, trans
fers to a recipient may depend on the survival of others, particularly the
spouse. In each case, the existence of alternative states of the world requires
changes in the donor's plans.
Let us simplify by ignoring Insurance and treating the donor's wealth
as invariant with respect to these states. To be concrete, consider the case
of a late decline in the recipient's income. The decline is equivalent to a
decrease in the recipient's endowment, thereby encouraging an increase in
9/
transfers to him.— Also, timing as well as size of the transfers is affected,
since a larger fraction is received in later periods.
Contingent transfers can be handled by treating the recipient's consimip-
tion expenditures as stochastic rather than his wealth. For example, consider
-8-^
a change in the donor's marital state, which turns out to be empirically
important^ Since the spouse can draw life span from the distribution of
lifetimes, one can interpret widowed status as shorter life, holding the donor's
age constant. The present value of expenditure on the spouse's consumption is
also smaller because of the early termination of that consumption. The effect
is a type of rationing by nature, in which different states of the world deter
mine different consumption of the spouse. The analysis is similar to the con
ditional demand analysis developed by Pollak (1969.).
Analytically, the donor's utility function in the kth state of the world
is
where the spouse is indexed by subscript 1 and the level of consumption by sub-^
script k. The donor's net wealth constraint is
"S = "d - V,k = ^DJ
By the budget constraint of the spouse, Tj^j^ Therefore smaller
spousal consuiiq[)tion corresponds to smaller spousal transfers, and widowed
marital state expands net wealth, - T^^^ Transfers to others Increase if
their consumption is a normal good,—^
B. Compensatory and noncompensatory inheritance
The model predicts, under the conditions described, that total transfers
lessen wealth inequality within fa^nllies. Yet because of many forms of the
transfers, it is unclear whether inheritance In particular reduces the inequality.
The question becomes whether or not other transfers beside Inheritance spe-
-9- .
cialize in compensation. If specialization is unimportant;, inheritance is
compensatory. This is the null hypothesis.
The alternative hypothesis is that other forms of trsinsfer are the prin
cipal sources of compensation. Rela.tlvely equal inheritance could be observed,
or even-a kind of inheritance seeming to exaggerate inequa,lity.
At least two reasons can be giyen foy specialization. First, gifts may
be superior to inheritances for this purpose, because the donor is present to
ensure the desired distribution of wealth.
In addition, the donor may encourage intersibling transfers through in
heritance.—^ Such transfers would be received by the less wealthy siblings,
and would be equivalent to an increase in their wealth, since resources are
freed which would otherwise have been spent in a market transaction.
To see why there are intersibling transfers, recall that the Altruistic
Theory predicts selection of the cheapest mode of transfer " (see footnote 4)•
But it is quite possible that sibling contributions such as time are the least
expensive source, particularly if there is Altruism between siblings. The
existence of the intersibling transfers creates an illusion by replacing
a market transaction with a nonmarke^t one. Since payments for intersibling
transfers are combined with compensatory transfers, one could observe a tendency
towards apparent equality of the transfers, or even anticompensatory inheritance
Figure 2 illustrates this illusion. The figure is identical to Figure 1
except for the introduction of the apparent transfer line GFH and the apparent
consumption point F, As before, the true consumption point is C. However,
because of intersibling transfers, it seems that 2 who has the larger endowment,
also receives a larger inheritance than 1, Apparent consumption of the two
A
recipients is C-„ and C ^ and inheritances in this example seem to accentuate
-IQ-
Equailty Line
'R1 Rl R H B
FIGURK 2 - InCerslbling Transfers and Apparent
Absence of Compensation
'Rl
Inequality. However, unmeasured Interslbllng transfers equalize consumption
and £^2 ~ the cost of such transfers In terms of gift md inheritance,
while the gain is C_ - . Since C_ - exceeds C_« - C_, the donor Indirectly
K KX K Ri KZ K
achelves a net gain. These explanations suggest that Inheritances and other
monetary transfers are indirectly compensatory.
C. Other reasons for a noncompensatory Inheritance
A different explanation relies on jealousy among the siblings or negative
interdependencies in their mutual consumption. Yet it seems largely unconvincing,
for reasons of symmetry in the negative interdependencies. For ^ample, the
denial of a larger inheritance to a poorer sibling harms the poorer in the s^e
manner as it would the wealthier sibling were compensation to occur. To Illustrate,
-11-
let there be two recipients and let the utility functions of each recipient
depend negatively on the other's consumption, so the entering- (1) are of the
form
(-) (+)
where the - and + indicate negative and positive marginal utilities respec
tively. Maximizing as before,
/3G 3G \
+ = 0 (12)
\3Cr2
are obtained as the first order conditions. But if the G«, are symaetric, then
the parenthetical expressions of (12) would be equal evaluated at ^R1 ^R2'
and the absence of compensation would remain unexplained.
A second explanation assumes the donor is uncertain about relative wealth
positions of siblings and bequeaths to them equally. This explanation also seems
unappealing if the donor bases his decisions on expected values, since there are
differences in sibling characteristics (for example, years of schooling) which
cause their expected wealth to differ.
III. Data base and study design
The data used in this study derive from a five percent random sample of
12/
probate records for the city of Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A. in the year 1965.—
The probate data were combined vrtLth information from interviews of survivors,
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yielding a basic sample of 659 estates and-1234 survivors* Due to the interview
procedure, an unusual combination of variables was obtained. Recipient charac
teristics include material inheritance ^d educational attainmentj marital status,
relationship to the deceased, usual number of visits to the deceased, and monthly
family income. Among the significant family level characteristics are the
number of inheritors, next of kin, or siblings, age of the deceased, his marital
status, and his education.
Because of random selection, the estates are representative iii size;
few are taxable under the U.S. Federal Estate Tax. As a consequence, inheritances
are modest in size, and a majority in every sample assume a value of zero or one
13/
thousand dollars.—
Let us investigate the characteristics of inheritance among sons-and
daughters, who constitute the majority of inheritors. Table 1 shows the in
cidence of equal inheritance for two samples.—^ Panel Aof the table looks
at all cases, where 71% inherit equally. However, equa,lity is tautological
either in the case where one son or daughter inherits, or in cases where all of
the children receive a zero Inheritance, Panel B is therefore based on a restricted
seunple where there is more than one sibling and mean inheritance is positive.
It becomes clear that equality is largely an artifact of the tautological cai^ses °
mentioned above. In only 10% of the smaller, relevant sample do we observe
equality.
Table 2 looks at the equality issue differently by computing within and
between family standard deviations of inheritance for all sons and dau^ters.
The within family deviation Is small judged by related ya^riation in recipient
characteristlcg, only 35% of the between fai9lly deviation. For example, the
corresponding ratios for recipient's education and income are 62% and 95%.
Despite the fact that the within family standard deviation contains an automatic
-13-
TABLE 1
INCIDENCE OF EQUAL INHERITANCE
SUBSAMPLE OF SONS AND DAUGHTERS
Sajnple and Size of
Inheritance Relative
to the Mean for Children
Decedent Married Decedent Unmarried
Number % Nimber %
A. All Cases (N = 410)
Above Mean 15 5.9 60 24.4
Equal to Mean 226 88.3 64 39.0
Below Mean 15 5.9 40 36.6
Total 256 100.1 164 100.0
B. More than one Sibling,
Mean Inheritance Positive
(N = 145)
Above Mean 15 44.1 60 36.0
Equal to Mean 4 11.8 11 9.9
Below Mean 15 44.1 40 54.1
Total 34 100.0 111 100.0
NOTE: The me^ for each family is computed only for sons and daughters. The
computation uses the logarithmic form employed in the empirical work,
where zero inheritances are equated to thousand dollar inheritances
in logs.
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TABLE 2
WITHIN AND BETWEEN FAMILY.STANDARD DEVIATIONS
OF INHERITANCE, AND MEAN INHERITANCE,
SUBSAMPLE OF SONS AND DAUGHTERS
(N - 41Q)
(Inheritance in Logarithms Except Where Noted)
Within Family
Standard Deviation
Between Family ^
Standard Deviation
Mean^
Geometric
Logarithmic ($1000)
0.308 0.871 0.590 1.804
NOTE: The within family standard deviation is the square root of the meain within
family sum of squares. The between family standard deviation is the
square root of the between family sum of squares. See below for precise
definitions.
c
Defined as / (X. - X.j) where X.. is the individual inheritance of
ij
N - 1
the ith individual in the jth family and X.. is the .mean inheritance for
the jth family. ^
Defined as /EN (X.. - X..)^ where N. is the number of observations
j ^ ^J
N - 1
for the jth family and X.. is the grand mean for the entire subsamjple
of inheritances.
The logarithmic mean is the mean of the logarithms of the inheritances;
the geometric mean is the antilogarithm of the logarithmic mean.
9'
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downward bias, for the reasons noted in connection with Tab.le 1, it is far
from equal to zero. We conclude that a search for compensation should be under
taken using techniques which isolate Effects of variation in individual wealth
on inheritance. Simple tabular analysis does not establish dominance of the
alternative, equal inheritance.
We enter a number of controls in the estimating equations, followed by
indicators of recipient's wealth. Several of the controls are measured at the
family level and pertain to all recipients. Among these are mean family income
in logarithms, marital status and age of the deceased, number of siblings or
next of kin, and mean labor force participants in families of recipients. The
individual recipient characteristics Include number of usual visits to the
deceased during his lifetime, education, marital status, and number of labor
force participants in the recipient's family. The last three of these are
entered as Indicators of the recipient's wealth.
The detailed discussion of the connection between the explanatory variables,
and the theoretical model of Section II is deferred for convenience to the next
section, but it is useful to illustrate here the general nature of the approach.
If children with greater education are more able, as we could expect, then their
endowment is greater and they should receive a larger inheritance according to
the compensatory hypothesis. Effects of inheritance on intrafamily wealth
inequality are tested indirectly through the test for the existence of com
pensation.
Table 3 describes the variables. All except mean family income are self-
explanatory, so we turn in closing to a discussion of this variable. Originally
income in the data is monthly family income of recipients, coded in nine
intervals. The monthly dimension of income is a serious weakness if one
seeks permanent income of the family to explain the inheritances. Income is
-16-
TABLE 3
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES, SUBSAMPLE OF
SONS AND DAUGHTERS
(N = 410)
Variable
Family Characteristics
Log of Mean Family Income in $
Marital Status of the Deceased ( = 1 if
unmarried, 2 if married)
Age of the Deceased in Years
Education of the Deceased in Years
Number of Inheritors
Number of Next of Kin
Number of Siblings
Individual Characteristics^
Education of Recipients in Years
Marital Status of Recipient ( = 0 if
unmarried, 1 if married)
Number of Labor Force Participants in
Recipient's Family
c
Usual Number of Visits by Recipient
Mean
6.607
1,602
70.568
7.604^
2.527
4.294
2.333
12.432
0.954
1.680
1.990
Standard
Deviation
0.318
0.490
8.577
3.993^
2.190
1.825
1.247
2.368
0.211
0.792
0.877
Calculation based on sample of N = 392, due to missing values.
Means of individual characteristics entered wherever multicollinearity problems
do not intervene.
Coding is 1 if daily, 2 if weekly, 3 if monthly, 4 if less often.
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reflned in three steps. First, it is coded in dollars by assigning midpoints
to closed intervals, and using the Pareto distribution, to estimate a mean
for the uppermost open interval.—^ "Second, to purge transitory errors in
monthly income, recorded income is regressed on the characteristics of the
individual and the estimated equation is used to calculate predicted or permanent
income.—^ Finally, predicted income is averaged by family and treated as a
proxy for parental wealth. It certainly outperforms actual mean income as
a predictor of inheritance in test regressions.
IV. Empirical Findings
Table 4 tests for evidence of inheritance compensation by two alternative
methods. Equations 4.1 and 4.2 use levels of the explanatory variables to
explain the level of inheritance. Equations 4.3 and 4.4 instead use deviations
of this independent variables from their respective family means to explain the
deviation of inheritsmce. In all cases, inheritance is coded in logarithms.
Level equations are studied first. Since inheritance has a lower limit
of zero, the equation residuals have a truncated Normal distribution, and Tobit
analysis is the appropriate estimation technique.—^ Different szunples are
used in 4.1 and 4.2; 4.1 uses all the observations on sons and daughters meeting
the selection criteria, while 4.2 is based on a subsaunple of unmarried decedents,
since in other cases zero inheritance to children is predominant.
The set of compensatory variables in these equations consists of recipient's
education, recipient's marital status, and the number of labor force participants
in the recipient's family. More educated sons and daughters, or married children,
are expected to receive smaller inheritances under compensation because they
have larger endowed wealth. Higher education within a family is associated
with greater ability and wealth, while married endowed wealth is larger due
-18-
TABLE 4
SONS AND DAUGHTERS INHERITANCE EqUATIONS
(Asymptotic Standard Errors In P^ren,theses)
—' -.111
Variable or Statistic
TOBIX Estlnates^
• b
OLS Estimates
4.1 4.2'^ 4.3 .. 4.4^
Log of 'Family Income 1.663^
(0.444)
1.895*^
(0.477)
Marital Status ,o£ the Deceased -2.276*^
(0.183)
Age of the Deceased 0.002
(0.010)
-0.017
(Q.012)
Number of Siblings -0.221*^
(0,073)
-0.171^
(0.077)
Mean Number of Labor Force
Participants Among Siblings
-0.640*^
(0.225)
-0.754^
(0.254)
Education of Recipient -0.038
(0.050)
-0.056
(0.053)
-0.014
(0,013)
-0,022
(0.026)
Number of Labor Force Participants
in Recipient's Family
-0.089
(0.108)
-0.155
(0.122)
-0.024
(0.016)
-0,059
(0,039)
Marital Status of Recipient -0.817*^
(0,361)
-0.546
(0.364)
-0.785^
(0.114)
-1.226^
(0.240) '
Usual Number of Visits by
the Recipient
0.016
(0.094)
-0.022
(0.102)
-0.040
(0.032)
-0^079
(0.059)
(Constant) -5.102 -7.327 0.010 0.042
Standard Error 1.341 1.105 0.297 0.414
5.582
0.118 0.166
F-Statistic 13.546 7,912
N 410 164 410 164
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TABLE A con't.
® Dependent variable is zero if the inheritance is zero, and the logarithm of
inheritance otherwise,
^ Dependent variable is the deviation of inheritance (coded as in from its
family mean; similarly, independent variables are entered as deviations from
their means.
Sample of unmarried decedents.
^ Estimate significantly differs from zero at the five percent level.
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to household complementarities between spouses. The role of the number of laboT
force participants Is less clear. More persons may work due to lower wealth
(the "added worker" hypothesis), or because there Is less intrinsic specializa
tion in household work, so that greater wealth is achieved if both spouses
work. Briefly, the results (see 4.1 and 4.2) show that education and marriage
18 /
have the expected signs, though only marriage is significant.Evidence of
compensation appears meager.The participation variable at the level of the
recipient is insignificant in these equations.
Usual visits to the deceased during his lifetime are includ.ed to test
for evidence of inheritance due to contributions to the donor. The fluctuating
sign and insignificance of visits suggest that contributions do not affect
inheritance.
Let us turn to a discussion of the family wide variables included in 4.1
and 4.2. First, inheritance seems to be income elastic, judging by the co
efficient on family income, although the estimate does not. differ significantly
from one. Second, married decedents leave smaller inheritances than unmarried
ones, an effect Interpreted in Section II as a stochastic increase in expenditures
upon the spouse and decrease in net wealth that can be spent on others. The
size of the effect indicates a dominance of the spouse in inheritance, explicable
in terms of the lifelong contributions of the spouse to income and sayings
[see Posner (1972, Ch. 17)]. An increase in the number of siblings diminishes
inheritance, a quantity effect which has an interpretation similar to donor's
marital state.—^ Donor's age is unimportant in either equation. Finally,
mean number of labor force partlcipailds among recipients is entered as a cor
rective for mean family income, since the latter may appear to increase simply
because more persons work, despite constant or even declining per capita incomei
Equations 4.3 and 4.4 measure all variables in deviations from family
-21-
raeans, and explain the pure within family variation of inheritance. Since
inheritance is no longer truncated at-zero, the equations are estimated using
ordinary least squares. Family level variables are eliminated by,this procedure.
The compensation hypothesis would argue that the deviation of inheritance should
be negatively related to the deviation of recipient's education and marital
status. The story which these equations tell is the same as the one.told by
the Toblt equations. Only recipient's marital status is significant'among the
regressors,
The combined results of Table 4 have an interesting interpretation.
None of the recipient wealth indicators significantly affect inheritance, including
individual income (omitted from this summary), with the exception of the recipient's
marital status. Likewise, all of the indicators are persistent traits either
of the recipients themselves or their families, again with the exception of the
recipient's marital state. Certainly this remark holds true of education and
Income of the recipients, and a recent investigation by Heckman (1977) suggests
that the Interperiod correlation of labor force participation is strongly
positive even for married women, despite their weaker attachment to the labor
force.
In contrast, whether because of death, divorce, or separation, jreclp-
ient's marital state can undergo sudden and unexpected change. Its impact on
Inheritance may reflect late compensation due to a deviation of the recipient's
prospects from the expectation. We are led to suppose that compensation is
otherwise concealed, either through planned completion prior to inheritance, or
planned attenuation through combination with intersibling transfers.
Table 5 carries the study further by examining more heterogeneous samples
for different behavior. All equations are Tobit estimates for the reason
explained in connection with Table 4. Equations 5.1 and 5.2 are run on samples
-22-
TABLE 5
NUCLEAJl FAMILY AND FULIL SAMPLE
INHERITANCE EqUAjIOl^S^
(Asymptotic Standard Errors in. Parentheses)
Val^iable or Statistic
Tobit Estimates
5.1 5.2' -5.3'
Log of Family Income 2.205®
(0.425)
1,646®
(0,484)
1.019®
(0.314)
Marital Status of the Deceased -2,017®
(0.179)
-1.945®
(0.186)
-1.756®
(0,160)
Age of the Deceased -0.029®
(0.009)
-0,013®
(0.012)
-0,014®
(0.007)
Number of Next of Kin -0.148®
(0.052)
-0.134®
(0.058)
-0,065®
(0,023)
Mean Number of Labor Force Participants
Among Recipients
-0.614®
(0.214)
-0.534
(0.273)
-0.418®
(0.183)
Percent of Recipients Married 0.052
(0.718)
Education of Recipient -0.116®
(0.047)
-0.088
(0.047)
-0.010
(0.037)
Number of Labor Force Participants
in Recipient's Family
-0.096
(0.105)
-0.126
(0.122)
-0.094
(0.093)
Marital Status of Recipient -1,677®
(0.272)
-1.774®
(0.456)
-1.573 '
(0,256)
Usual Number of Visits by the Recipient -0.065
(0.096)
0.002.
(0.098)
-0,274®
(0.077)
(Constant) -4.800 -2.775 -2.000
Standard Error 1.390 1.115 1,465
2' 22.561®
440 289
59.288®
576
-23-
TABLE 5 con't.
^ Dependent Variable is zero if the• inheritance is ze^-o, and the logarithm
of inheritance otherwise.
^ Sample of spouses and sons a,nd daughte?:s.
^ Sample as in (b), but number pf recipients must exceed gne»
Combined sample of all recipients.
Estimate significantly differs from zero at the five percent level.
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whlch Include spouses as well as sons and daughters. The sample on which 5,2
is based in addition requires that the number of recipients exceed one, thereby
excluding in another way downward bias in inheritance variation (see Section
III for a discussion). The two principal differences between Table 4 and these
equations are the higher income elasticity of inheritance, ^nd the significance
of recipient's education. Of the two sets of estimates these would seem
the superior ones since the calculations include parental incomes, surely^ closer
to the ideal than recipient incomes taken at random. On the other hand, the
education effect is not likely to reflect compensation, but increased parental"
wealth. The greater endowment of spouses Initiates redistribution in favor of
sons and daughters.
The final equation (5.3) is fitted to data for all recipients. The
principal difference from earlier findings is the significance of visits during
the lifetime.
The Tobit calculations can be used to extend understanding of the dis
tributional effects of inheritance. If the probability of positive Inheritance
ri^es with income, this finding and the high income elasticities of Table 5
would imply that inheritance does contribute to the positive skewness of income
and wealth. The Tobit coefficients are used to calculate probabilities of
21/
positive inheritance, assuming a set of traits for the recipient.-r-' Four
calculations are performed on both the sons and dau^ters sample, and the full
sample, based on differing assumptions about the donor's marital state (married
or unmarried) and mean family income (low and high for the sample of sons and
daughters). Sons and daughters are assigned the same characteristics as
recipients in general; therefore, computed probabilities differ only because
coefficients for the two samples differ. Table 6 contains the estimated
probabilities. Sons and daughters have a consistently larger probability of
-25-
PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING POSITIVE
INHERITANCE IN LOGARITHMS
Probability for
Assumed Charac
teristics of:
Estimates used Coefficients Calculated on
Sons and Daughters Sample^ Full Sample'^
Recipient I^ 0.01 0.00
Recipient 11^ 0.20 6.04
Recipient III^ 0.48 0.06
Recipient IV® 0.95 0.35
Probability =
P" 1 „ "4- K/a)' „
^ ./2n ® ''"i •
-K-e
where a »
o
Corresponds to probability of receiving an inheritance larger than one
thousand dollars.
The equation used is 4.1.
c
The equation used is 5.3.
^ Monthly family income is assumed to be $285; the donor is assumed to
be married, aged 70, with number of siblings equal to 2 (next of kin
equal to A in the full sample); two persons are at work for every recipient,
all recipients are married, all have a high school education and all
make weekly visits to the donor.
Values as in d, except donor is assumed to be unmarried.
^ Values as in d, except monthly income of the family is assumed to be $1992,
® Values as in d, except donor is assumed to be unmarried and monthly
family income is assumed to be $1992.
-26-
recelvlng a positive inheritance than recipients In general. The probability
for sons and daughters rises dramatically from 0.01 to 0.20 for low Income
families Is the spouse Is absent; but the chance Is 0.48 even If the spouse
survives given a high Income. Only In the case which asstmies an unmarried donor,
and high Income Is the probability ever above 0.20 for recipients In general.
Because our principal concern Is with the nuclear family, and since
spouses, sons and daughters dominate Inheritance, It Is clear that both the
probability and size of Inheritance Increase with Income. Therefore, Inheri
tance contributes to the Inequality of wealth between families and Its positive
skewness. Moreover, since the evidence of compensation Is n^ager, Inheritance
except for possible concealed effects seems to contribute similarly to the
Inequality of wealth between Individuals.
V, Conclusion
This study has uncovered a number of findings concerning the link between
inheritance and wealth inequality. First, Inheritance does not at least directly
compensate children for comparative disadvantages. Equal inheritance appears
to predominate. This paper has argued that transfer compensation is concealed, .
either because of Intersibling transfers, or because it is substantially com
pleted prior to Inheritance,
If the intersibling transfers are the correct explanation, it is im
portant to consider that inheritance samples are secretly heterogeneous.
They combine subsamples of zero and positive intersibling transfers, and
inheritance compensation should be observable in the former subsample.
However, it cannot be said that this part of the theory has yet been subjected
to a rigorous test.
-2 7-
The second finding is that spouses, sons, or daughters do not receive
inheritance because of their contributions, measured by the frequency of their
visits to him during his lifetime. Nevertheless, other recipients do inherit
for this reason; this divergence of behavior may stem from the reverse Altruism
of closely related inheritors.
Third, the size of inheritance depends markedly on the number of siblings
or next of kin, and the donor's marital state, findings attributed here to
quantity or rationing effects.
Fourth, both the income elasticity of inheritance and the dependence
of the probability of positive inheritance upon income suggest ,that it contributes
to inequality by fattening the upper tail of the wealth distribution.
Two suggestions are made to guide the direction of further research
on the compensation issue. The alternative explanations for the seeming absence
of compensation provide the clues. In the first place, more must be known about
the size, form and distribution of gifts during the lifetime if additional
progress isi to be made in understanding the mechanism of intergenerational
transfers as a whole. Gifts within the family appear to be severly under-
reported in available data sets, and their importance has beeii correspondingly
22/underestimated.— Additional evidence on gifts of the kind described will
enable researchers to gauge the importance of compensation through gifts. In
the second place, variables such as the distance between siblings, the length
of time they have been separated, and visits by one sibling to another should
provide an avenue for evaluating the importance of Intersibling transfers,
especially in attenuating compensation through inheritance. Perhaps if these
steps are undertaken, our understanding of intergenerational relationships
1 -28-
t
and their link with wealth distribution will advance substantially beyond
its present scope.
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa 50011
U.S.A.
1/
2/
3/
4/
1
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This Is the Indirect utility function, which assimies prior maximization
with respect to Individual commodities. Thus the and G_, are functions
of commodity prices and expenditures, after the substitution of demand
functions Into the utility function. In the formulation used In the text,
commodity prices are suppressed because they are unvarying. The ex-,
pendltures pertain to each recipient alone because of the separability
assumption. See Strotz (1959).
The Tjjj are sums, or
J ^ Vm <•>
(l+r)^
where is the price of transferring one dollar of the kth form of
transfer (land, human capital, household time) In the 1th period to
the jth recipient, and T., . Is the number of units received by j In
that period and that form.^ Therefore, from (a),
P^, = E Z (b)
S Z „ •
1 k Ikj
so that FRj Is a weighted average.
The theory Implies that marginal costs are equated across forms of the
transfers which are made to a recipient. Substitute (a) In footnote
3 Into the budget constraint (3), and maxlmlze(l) with respect to each
transfer coi]q)onent separately, and It will be found that
- H ^ " ^^Ikl ~^1 =(1+r)^ (1+r)^
t . . auIf a transfer Is made. Hence MC., . = MC. = — / X . If asset transfers
iKj J OUjy
5/
6/
7/
1/
i/
10/
W
w
13/
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are made MC. = since taxation, etc. typically do not differ
for recipients.
The second order conditions require that bordered diagonal determln^ts
of the form
(-1)
N+1
-1
dMC
dT
R1
tl 0
dMC
. . og;;.
BN
-MCri . . .
-1
-MC
R1
-MC
BN
alternative in, sign, beginning with a positive sign for N = 1., Ex- ,,
panding the determinant for N = 1, a sufficient condition for the'deter;^v-
minant to be positive is that 6" , 6" be negative or that Grfunctibns ,
, I D RX
be concave. . . ,i
Relatives of different degree should be treated separately. One reason,;
stressed by the sociobiologists, is that the sharing of genes and the
amount of Altruism decline as relationships become more distant.
For example, the deviation of wealth from the family mem is less .
negative than the deviation of the endowment from its. family mean%'
- V'' " ° ,
Differentiating the first order conditions (5), 1 '
since other consumption is a normal good. Hence,
3Tjy/3Ejy = 3C^/3E^ - 1 <0.
To see this analytically, solve the donor's problem subject to. of;
(10), then derive wealth effects on the assumption that dl^ ¥ ^
Tomes (1977) stresses the importance of intersibllng transfers.
The data are described in Sussman, Cates, and Smith (1970)> . '
The distribution for the sao^le of sons and dau^ters.is:.zer6.tp one
thousand dollars, 247 cases; two to five thousand dollars» 111 c^es;
14/
15/
16/
17/
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slx to ten thousand dollars, 23 cases; eleven to twenty thousand dollars,
20 cases; and twenty-one thousand dollars and over, 9 cases; or 410
cases In total.
In general, requirements for an observation to be Included in any sample
were that recipients be between the ages of 25 and 65, the source of
their income be known, that someone in their family be currently working,
the principal wage earner be male, and that education of recipients
be known.
The Pareto equation is useful for approximating the upper tail of
income distributions. Its form is
JinN = K - a log X, Cd)
where N = number of persons whose income is at or above level X.
For this study cells by recipient's age and income were created and
^ was estimated from the cell data. The estimate obtained was 6l, = 1.68,
Bowley (1920), pp. 462-463 shows that mean income equal to or exceeding
level X, for a Pareto distribution is
X=^ Xi. (e) .
Hence, since X- is known and 6i is estimated from the Pareto regression,
X can be estimated.
The equation estimated was (standard errors in parentheses)
LMINC = 5,832 + 0.083 YEDR + 0,009 ACER + 0.016 MARK
(0.008) (0.002) (0,076)
+ 0.239 NWAGR - 0.408 RACER - 0.136 RES + 0.016 RELl
(0,037) (0,103) (0.022) (0,128)
- 0,087 REL2 + 0.340 REL3 + 0.090 REL4, R^ = 0.400, N= 583,
(0,128) (0.150) (0,034)
In this equation, LMINC = Jin (actual monthly income), YEDR = years of
schooling, ACER = age in years; MARK = 0 if recipient is not married,
1 if married; RACER = 0 if recipient is white, 1 if he is black; RES =
quality of housing, and RELl through REL4 assume values of 1 if the
recipient is Protestant, Catholic, Jewish or Eastern Orthodox, 0 other
wise (unknown category omitted).
The equation is such that for the t**^ observation,
(X e + U. RHS > 0
Y, ^ (f)
'0 RHS < 0,
0«
A
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where Y is the dependent variable (Inheritance), X the row vector
of Independent variables* and B the column vector ox coefficients^
It Is usually assumed that N(0,cr^), This nonlinear problem (of
estimating 3). is solved using maximum likelihood. See Memiya (1973)
and Tobln (1958) for discussions of the general method.
18/ Very similar results were found in smaller samples where the within, family
variation of inheritance is expected to be greatest, namely those which
require the number of recipients to exceed one, and/or the spouse to be
absent.
19/
20/
21/
22/
The xf statistics in table 4 test for the importance of recipient
characteristics as a group and find them insignificant. The statistics
themselves are itwice the absolute value of the difference in the logarithms
of the likelihood functions with and without entry of the recipient
characteristics^ ^d the degree of freedom is the difference in the number
of coefficients fitted. See Brownlee (1965), pp. 111-113 for a dlscusislon.
For an application to Toblt, see Tobln (1958),
Number of siblings is assumed to be independent of inheritance size,
so that causation runs only in the direction of inheritance.
" V
I , ' II-
Referring to fn. 17, the probability Is the same as the probability that
Y > 0, or U./a > - X 6/a. But U /a'\'N(0,l), and the probability is •
t t ^ ' la ' .
the upper tail area of the normal distribution.
Dickinson (1970), Table 2.1, p. 41, finds that charitable gifts as
recorded in income tax data are over ten times larger than charitable
bequests; while noncharitable gifts are a minor fraction of noncharitable
bequests according to Shoup (1966).
9
a
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